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Richard Wollheim holds, famously, that picto-
rial representation is to be understood in terms of
a visual experience of a special kind, which he
calls “seeing-in,” an experience that suitable
spectators enjoy when they look at pictures. On
viewing a picture of a fire engine, one sees a fire
engine in the marks on the surface of the picture.
I have argued that pictures are essentially props
in visual games of make-believe of a certain
kind, and that the crucial perceptual experience
—which I am happy to call “seeing-in”—is an
imaginative as well as a perceptual one. The
viewer imagines seeing a fire engine as she looks
at a picture of one, imagining her actual visual
experience to be of a fire engine. Wollheim and I
have carried on an intermittent dialogue in the
course of developing and explaining our respec-
tive theories of depiction, commenting on one
another’s views and on the relations between
them. I continue the dialogue in this essay, con-
centrating now on Wollheim’s “On Pictorial
Representation,” the most recent statement and
defense of his theory, as well as his Painting as
an Art.1
I
Wollheim endorses (with minor reservations)
Alberti’s observation that “the painter is con-
cerned solely with representing what can be
seen,” which he takes to express a constraint on
the scope of representation: only what is visible
can be represented.2 The seeing that Alberti has
in mind is, surely, ordinary visual perception of
particular existing objects (or events), what we
might call seeing things “face-to-face.”
The things that can be seen and so can be repre-
sented, Wollheim observes, include both objects
and events. Some of them are particular objects
or events, while others are “objects or events
merely of a particular kind.” “So we can have a
representation of Madame Moitessier” (Ingres’s
1851 portrait), “or a representation of a young
woman behind a bar, perhaps a young woman
of some specificity—but no particular young
woman” (Eduard Manet’s La Prune, c. 1877).3
Is what is represented, in the latter case,
something that can be seen? I would expect Al-
berti to point out that it is possible to see partic-
ular existing things of this kind, actual young
women behind bars, even though nothing would
count as seeing (face-to-face) “the woman in the
picture,” the woman the picture represents. And
I expect that he would take this to satisfy the
principle that painters are “concerned solely
with representing what can be seen.” What can-
not be represented (pictured) are presumably
things such as the average price of oil in the
1970s, magnetic fields, and Cartesian egos.4
Wollheim chooses not to understand the con-
straint on what can be represented in this man-
ner. There are two different ways of seeing
things, he explains: one can see things “face-
to-face,” and one can see things “in a marked
surface.” Some things can be seen only in the
second manner, but that is all that is required for
them to be representable. “Representation does
not have to limit itself to what can be seen
face-to-face: what it has to limit itself to is what
can be seen in a marked surface”.5 Objects or
events that are “merely of a particular kind” are
among the things that can be seen in a marked
surface but not face-to-face, Wollheim claims.
So the nonparticular woman represented by La
Prune is representable not because particular
things of that sort can (could) be seen face-
to-face, but because this nonparticular one can
be seen “in a marked surface.”
Wollheim appears committed to the view that
there really are nonparticular women (and non-
particular battles, etc.)—special kinds of things
that can be seen in a special way. It is not clear
how serious he means this commitment to be.6
But it is not clear, either, what alternative he
would endorse, or what alternatives are open to
him. People do sometimes speak of “seeing pink
elephants,” arguably without implying that there
are any such. (One might question whether this
is a literal use of “see”; I prefer to think of it as
short for “seem to see.”) But Wollheim obvi-
ously does not regard seeing-in as hallucinating,
as a kind of visual illusion, and he is obviously
right not to do so.7
Are his nonparticular women fictional enti-
ties? If so, the puzzles about their ontological
status are familiar, at least (even more familiar
than those concerning objects of hallucinations).
And some, I among them, would argue that we
need not suppose that there really are such
things while acknowledging, indeed insisting
on, the convenience of speaking as though there
are. I would expect Wollheim to be unsympa-
thetic to this suggestion, as it encourages regard-
ing imagination as more central to depiction
than he seems willing to allow. But in Painting
as an Art he is amenable to construing “There
are peasants there” uttered in front of a picture
of haymakers as an “exercise in make-believe.”8
He sharply contrasts “There are peasants
there” with “I see peasants” (also uttered in front
of the picture of haymakers), however, insisting
that the latter expresses “a genuine perceptual
judgment” not involving make-believe.9 This
sharp contrast is intuitively unattractive, to say
the least, especially since the peasants that one
“sees” are surely (as it were) none other than the
ones that are “there.” It is not clear how Woll-
heim will account for the naturalness of com-
ments such as, “There are peasants there, whom
I see” and “There are peasants there; I can see
them.” He wants to insist on the fact that the
viewer enjoys a genuine visual experience,
which grounds the visual nature of depiction,
not just an imaginary or make-believe one. But
this fact is in no danger, not on my account in
any case. For although I deny that the viewer’s
experience is, literally, one of seeing peasants, it
is an actual visual experience. What is merely
imagined is that this visual experience has peas-
ants as its object.
So why not allow that “There are peasants
there” and “I see peasants” both involve make-
believe? To return to Manet’s La Prune, we
imagine seeing a woman whom we imagine to be
there. This makes life a lot easier. For the seeing
that I merely imagine being engaged in is per-
fectly ordinary, face-to-face seeing, and it is see-
ing of a perfectly ordinary, particular woman, in-
deed an existing one—that being the only kind of
woman there can be. There is no need to recog-
nize seeing of a special kind, directed on a pecu-
liar and otherwise unseeable object.10 I do (genu-
inely) enjoy a special kind of visual experience,
but it is one that is understood in familiar terms
—in terms of really seeing the picture surface
(face-to-face) and imagining this seeing to be of
a woman (an ordinary one). Viewers of the por-
trait of Madame Moitessier enjoy an experience
of just this kind also; the only difference being
that in that case there is a woman whom one
imagines seeing.
The reader will have noticed that, although
Wollheim takes La Prune to represent a woman
“merely of a particular kind,” there is an obvious
sense in which it represents a perfectly ordinary,
particular woman, or (this may or may not
amount to the same thing) it represents a woman
as being perfectly ordinary and particular. Put
differently, the woman “in the world of the pic-
ture” is, in that world, an ordinary particular
woman—indeed an existent one. This observa-
tion is awkward for the proponent of seeing-in as
Wollheim characterizes it. Conceivably, he
might stick to his guns, reiterating that what is
represented, what a (suitable) perceiver sees in
the marked surface, is actually a woman “merely
of a particular kind,” while allowing that the
perceiver sees this nonparticular woman (in the
marked surface) as a particular one. The picture
would thus be understood to misrepresent a
woman merely of a particular kind as being a
particular woman. We need not dwell on the
unattractiveness of this suggestion.
I claim a further advantage for my way of
dealing with what Wollheim calls depictions of
things “merely of a certain kind”: It generalizes
readily to works other than pictures. Stories and
novels often portray “nonparticular” persons
and “nonparticular” objects and events of other
sorts, in whatever sense La Prune does. There is
no special visual experience, “seeing-in,” which
takes such things as objects. Are they objects of
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a special experience of reading, one we might
call “reading-in,” or “reading about-in”, even
though they cannot be read about in the ordinary
manner—presumably the manner in which we
read about actual people in newspapers?
It is far better to say that readers of novels
and stories imagine ordinary particular people.
Sometimes they imagine reading, in an ordinary
newspaper manner, about such people. Often
(depending on the nature of the story or novel)
they imagine hearing verbal reports of them, or
learning about them, or anyway knowing about
them. What is imagined is in any case (exotic
examples aside) ordinary things cognized in or-
dinary ways.11
II
In his marvelously rich and perceptive explora-
tions of pictorial representation, Wollheim has
surprisingly little to say about the perspectives
or points of view from which things are de-
picted. He distinguishes between the foreground
and the background of various paintings, this
being, of course, a matter of the pictures’ per-
spectives.12 He describes the fundamental expe-
rience of seeing-in as seeing one thing in front of
another.13 He notes that in Nicolas Poussin’s
Rinaldo and Armida, Rinaldo’s “face is some-
what turned towards us.”14 But he does not, so
far as I know, spell out what it is for a depiction
to be from one point of view rather than another,
or as we sometimes put it, what it is to depict
something as seen from a certain perspective.
How might he do this?
It is safe to assume that he would want to ac-
count for this in terms of the visual experiences of
suitable observers; so do I. His comment about
Rinaldo’s face being turned toward us comes in a
paragraph describing “what we see” in the pic-
ture. So perhaps a picture’s depictive point of
view consists in what the suitable spectator sees
in it.15 How can this be? What we see in the pic-
ture is Rinaldo and various of his properties—the
position of his head and arm relative to his body,
his being asleep, etc. The perspective is not
among his properties. He does have relational
properties that we see—his head being turned
away from Armida, for instance, whom we also
see in the picture, a property that is not constitu-
tive of the picture’s perspective. Wollheim says
that Rinaldo’s head is turned slightly toward us.
Do we see this relational property in the picture
surface? We do not see ourselves in it, obviously.
Do we see Rinaldo turned toward observers (our-
selves?) who, although not themselves seen in
the picture, are understood to be “there”? Woll-
heim does allow that certain paintings have “a
representational content in excess of what they
represent,” of what can be seen in them; there
may be a figure “in the represented space [but]
not the part of it which is represented.”16 In some
cases there are unrepresented spectators, what he
calls the “spectator in the picture,” whom the
viewer, the spectator of the picture, identifies
with, imagines from the inside.17 But even in
these cases the viewer is not part of the represen-
tational content of the picture, not in the repre-
sented space;18 she merely identifies, imagina-
tively, with someone who is. And most pictures
do not contain a spectator in the picture any-
way.19 Yet most or all pictures depict things
“from a certain point of view.”20 I do not see how
this can be explained in terms of what is seen in
the picture.21
The perspective from which one sees some-
thing, in cases of ordinary visual perception, is a
matter of the point in space, relative to the object
seen, from which one sees it. (This usually has
consequences for what is seen, of course. But it
would be a mistake to identify the experience of
seeing from a particular perspective with the
properties of the thing that one sees.) The viewer
of Rinaldo and Armida is actually at a certain
place relative to the picture—seven feet from it
and slightly to the left of center, for instance. It
is from this position that one sees Rinaldo in the
picture surface. But this location in space does
not correlate with one’s perspective on Rinaldo
in the sense in which “his face is turned toward
us,” the sense in which it is the perspective from
which he is depicted. To change one’s position
relative to the canvas, to move closer to it, for
instance, or farther to the left, does not affect
one’s point of view in the latter sense. (This is
why we can say that the picture depicts Rinaldo
from a certain point of view; we cannot nor-
mally say this about freestanding sculpture.)
Shall we say that the markings on the canvas
are such that, from wherever the viewer is ac-
tually positioned, what she sees in the picture
surface is Rinaldo-from-a-certain-angle-and-
distance? It is not clear what this might mean.
And the angle and distance from which (in some
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sense) she sees Rinaldo, in the picture, is in any
case not her actual perspective or point of
view—not in anything like the sense of perspec-
tive that applies to ordinary vision. Wollheim
insists that the viewer actually sees Rinaldo, but
it is unclear how this seeing-in can actually be
from a certain perspective, apart from the ordi-
nary perspective one has on the picture itself.
The solution is staring us in the face: On look-
ing at the picture one imagines seeing Rinaldo
from a certain (approximate) angle and dis-
tance.22 This, curiously, is what Wollheim seems
to be saying about the special case of pictures
that possess a “spectator in the picture.” The
viewer identifies with this personage, and so
imagines seeing what he sees from his perspec-
tive. Why cannot the viewer imagine seeing the
depicted objects from a given perspective with-
out having such a spectator to identify with?
Otherwise, the obvious fact that most or all pic-
tures depict things “from a perspective or point
of view” remains mysterious.
III
The upshot of these several worries is that
Wollheim’s characterization of seeing-in, of the
experience of picture perception, is seriously in-
complete. One way to indicate what is missing,
while sidestepping any misunderstandings that
may arise from different conceptions of the
imagination, is to observe that there is no place,
or no obvious place, in his account of the con-
tent of the viewer’s experience for anything like
the thought or idea or impression or awareness
or conception or notion of an ordinary seeing of
an ordinary woman.23 Instead, he has perceivers
seeing objects of a different kind, in a special
way. Perhaps if pressed, he would acknowledge
some such thought or idea or impression. That
would be a big step toward my way of under-
standing his notion of seeing-in, whether or not
he agreed to speak of “imagining.”
He does say that the recognitional aspect of
seeing-in, when one sees a boy in a stained wall,
for instance, is “capable of being described as
analogous to” the experience of seeing a boy
face-to-face. But he insists that the two sorts of
experience are “phenomenologically incommen-
surate,” and that it is a confusion to ask “how
experientially like or unlike” the one is to the
other. “We get lost once we start comparing the
phenomenology of our perception of the boy
when we see him in the wall . . . with that of our
perception of [the] boy seen face-to-face.”24 In-
sofar as I understand this, I think I agree. I take it
to mean, roughly, that the two experiences differ
not in “degree,” but in “kind,” that it is wrong or
misleading to describe the experience of see-
ing-in or its recognitional aspect as an experience
somewhat like that of face-to-face seeing (as
some resemblance theories of depiction might
have it). Wollheim constantly refers to seeing-in
as a distinct kind of perception, or a visual experi-
ence with a distinctive phenomenology.
Agreeing with this does not require excluding
the thought or impression of face-to-face seeing
of a boy from the phenomenology of seeing a
boy in the marks. Rather than being somewhat
like engaging in face-to-face seeing, seeing-in is
a visual experience that involves (as I choose to
put it) imagining—merely imagining—doing
so. And what is imagined is not just somewhat
like face-to-face seeing, but the real thing. The
difference between imagining seeing and actu-
ally doing so is, I take it, a difference in “kind.”
Malcolm Budd argues that if the two phe-
nomenologies are incommensurate, the recogni-
tional aspect of seeing-in cannot be understood
on the analogy of face-to-face seeing. Hence,
the “recognitional aspect of seeing-in . . . is re-
vealed as having no nature of its own.”25 Under-
standing the recognitional aspect to involve
imagining seeing makes sense of the claim that
it is both analogous to and incommensurate with
face-to-face seeing.
Wollheim urges that “there is an important
causal traffic between seeing-in and seeing
face-to-face. Children learn to recognize many
familiar and unfamiliar objects through first see-
ing them in the pages of books.”26 This is no sur-
prise on the imagining seeing account. It is a
familiar fact of experience, confirmed by empir-
ical research, that doing things in imagination
can often improve one’s ability to do them in
fact.27 Imagining (visualizing) a face from a ver-
bal description may help me to recognize it in
the flesh.28
Jerrold Levinson has, inadvertently, provided
support for my claim about the lacuna in
Wollheim’s notion of seeing-in. He claims to
agree with Wollheim that “seeing-in is generally
prior to, and not to be analyzed in terms of,
imagined seeing.”29 But his discussion (sketchy
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though it is) suggests that he is thinking of this
experience very differently from the way Woll-
heim does, and points strongly in the direction
of the kind of imagining seeing I take to be cen-
tral.30
He makes a stab at clarifying the recog-
nitional aspect of seeing-in: “In looking at a pic-
ture of a woman,” he proposes, “it seems to you
as if you are seeing a woman (alternatively, you
have an impression of seeing a woman), in vir-
tue of attending visually to portions of the can-
vas. The core of seeing-in . . . is a kind of as-if
seeing that is both occasioned by and inextrica-
bly bound up with such registering.”31 To say
that it “seems as if” something is the case often
implies, perhaps even entails, that it is not the
case; Levinson’s stab thus appears to conflict
with Wollheim’s insistence that to see a woman
in a picture really is to see a woman, though in a
special manner.
The kind of seeing of a woman Levinson has
in mind, the seeing it “seems as if” one engages
in, is surely ordinary face-to-face seeing of an
ordinary woman. Levinson thus brings on board
exactly what I claim, most fundamentally, to be
missing from Wollheim’s account of seeing-in,
the (unarticulated) thought or impression or idea
of seeing an ordinary woman in an ordinary
manner.
Why does Levinson deny that seeing a
woman in a picture involves imagining seeing a
woman face to face? In one discussion he sim-
ply declares that he finds it “odd” to say this,32
but a footnote to his essay on Wollheim reveals
more: “On my conception of it, imagining is
necessarily active or contributory. . . . By con-
trast, seeming to one as if . . . is passive or recep-
tive, not something one brings about and ac-
tively sustains, but something that . . . simply
occurs. Seeing X in Y is something that happens
to one.”33 Since I have always insisted that the
kind of imagining central to my theory can be
and frequently is nondeliberate, something that
happens to us (often as a result of prompting by
a picture or other prop), his disagreement with
my account turns out to be verbal rather than
substantive. Understanding as if seeing as imag-
ining seeing (in my sense), it is not hard to con-
strue Levinson’s suggestion that the viewer
imagines seeing a woman “in virtue of attending
visually to portions of the canvas” as the claim
that the viewer imagines his seeing of the canvas
to be a seeing of a woman. (Other construals are
possible as well.)
Levinson does offer another reason for resist-
ing analyzing seeing-in in terms of imagining
seeing, but it backfires. If all seeing-in involves
imagined seeing, he claims, “we lose a resource
for explaining some of the special character,
whether of immediacy, intimacy, absorbing-
ness, or emotional impact, of some pictures as
opposed to others.”34 I have identified enormous
resources available to my theory for making dis-
tinctions of these kinds within the class of things
serving as props in visual games of make-
believe—for accounting for differences of “real-
ism,” in several senses, among depictions, and
for understanding different styles of depiction.
The visual games in which pictures are props
vary greatly in richness and vivacity. They are
more or less indeterminate, in various respects.
The principles of make-believe may or may not
be linked to resemblances of one sort or another,
and they may be internalized to different de-
grees. Some pictures restrict viewers’ participa-
tion in the game, in one dimension or another.
And so on.35 Levinson would forgo all of these
resources for the sake of a simple crude contrast
between inducing or not inducing perceivers to
imagine seeing the object represented.
I claim support for my account of depiction,
also, in a recent discussion by Catherine Abell
and Gregory Currie. “Pictures aid the simulated
seeing of their objects,” they propose. “A depic-
tion is an input to the simulation of seeing some-
thing.” And they speak of simulations as involv-
ing “pretend perceptions.”36
IV
I turn now to objections Wollheim has raised to
my theory of depiction.
In Painting as an Art, Wollheim claimed that
my make-believe theory “holds that there is a
conventional link between the appearance of the
picture and what we are led to make-believedly
see” and so fails to “ground what a painting rep-
resents in the kind of visual experience that the
representation will cause” in suitable specta-
tors.37 My reply is that (what I call) principles
of generation or principles of make-believe are
not in general “conventional” in any robust
sense. In Mimesis I warned against characteriz-
ing them thus.38 Also, although the principles
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specify what imaginings are appropriate, given
the nature of the props, appreciators do not usu-
ally consult them, or even have them in mind, in
deciding what to imagine. Indeed, they usually
do not decide what to imagine, but simply find
themselves imagining in a certain manner,
prompted by properties of the work before
them.39
The role of the principles of make-believe in
my account is exactly analogous to that of Woll-
heim’s own “standard of correctness” in his.
Neither compromises the visual nature of depic-
tion:
While a standard of correctness applies to the seeing
appropriate to representations, it is not necessary that
a given spectator should, in order to see a given repre-
sentation appropriately, actually draw upon, rather
than merely conform to, that standard of correctness.
He does not, in other words, in seeing what the picture
represents, have to do so through first recognizing
that this is or was the artist’s intention. On the con-
trary he may—and art historians frequently do—infer
the correct way of seeing the representation from the
way he actually sees it . . . and, for a spectator reason-
ably confident that he possesses the relevant skills
and information, this is perfectly legitimate.40
An entirely different objection, which Wollheim
has advanced more recently, focuses on my
claim that on viewing a picture of a fire engine,
for instance, one imagines one’s actual perceiv-
ing of the picture to be a perceiving of a fire en-
gine. His argument consists of rhetorical ques-
tions:
My difficulty . . . is how to understand the core pro-
ject, or imagining one perceptual experience to be an-
other. For if we succeed, in what way does the origi-
nal experience retain its content? For, what is left of
the experience of seeing the surface when I success-
fully imagine it to be some other experience? How-
ever, if I do continue to see the surface, or this experi-
ence retains its content, how have I succeeded in
imagining it, the experience, to be an experience of
seeing a face?41
He sees no difficulty, in general, in imagining
one action or experience to be a different one.
One may move one’s hands in a jerky and irreg-
ular fashion, imagining this to be an action of
conducting an orchestra. What he claims to find
problematic is imagining of a perceptual experi-
ence of one kind that it is a perceptual
experience of a different kind.
This does not seem to me to be a problem at
all. Why should imagining a perceptual experi-
ence to have one content while recognizing that
it actually has a different one be any more diffi-
cult than imagining an object to have properties
different from those one realizes it really pos-
sesses—imagining a glob of mud to be a pie, for
instance? I listen to a Glenn Gould recording of
Bach’s Art of the Fugue. My actual perceptual
experience is of sounds emanating from a
speaker in my living room, but I imagine my ex-
perience to be of a live performance in a concert
hall.42 Attending a performance of Die Zauber-
flöte, I hear the sounds produced by the flutist in
the pit orchestra, imagining my experience to be
of sounds produced by Papageno with his crude
wooden instrument.
Patrick Maynard reminded me that Scottie, in
Hitchcock’s Vertigo, dresses up Judy precisely
in order to enjoy a vivid imaginative experience
of perceiving the now deceased woman he knew
as Madeleine. Surely Scottie’s actual experience
remains one of perceiving the dressed-up Judy;
and surely he imagines this experience to be one
of perceiving Madeleine. Never mind that Judy
turns out to be Scottie’s Madeleine. Scottie’s
imaginative project as he conceived it, believing
Judy and Madeleine to be different persons, is
perfectly coherent.
It is surely coherent, also, to suggest that in
interacting with her husband or her boss a per-
son might, perhaps unconsciously, imagine her-
self to be interacting with her father or her
mother. Of course this suggestion includes the
hypothesis that she imagines her perceptions of
the husband or boss to be perceptions of her fa-
ther or mother.
In all of these cases, not only is the actual ob-
ject of a person’s perceptual experience in fact
different from what she imagines it to be and not
only does she know this to be so, it is likely that
the actual intentional content of her experience
is different from what she imagines it to be, i.e.,
the “original experience retains its content” even
as she imagines it to have a different content.
The sounds produced by the flutist performing
Die Zauberflöte seem to the listeners to be just
that, while they imagine themselves to be hear-
ing Papageno’s playing.
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Wollheim notes that “imagining one experi-
ence to be another is something more experien-
tial than simply imagining that one experience is
the other.”43 This seems right (or rather it seems
right that a more experiential imagining is in-
volved in picture perception). It is not easy to
say what “experiential” means here. But the ex-
amples of imagining one experience to be an-
other, presented above, seem to me to be appro-
priately experiential.
If there is some sort of incompatibility be-
tween the two intentional contents, why is not
this a problem for Wollheim’s own notion of
seeing-in? Seeing-in is an experience character-
ized by what he calls “twofoldness”: one sees
the marked picture surface, and one sees the
subject of the picture. These are not two inde-
pendent experiences, he insists, but two aspects
of a single one. It is hard to know what this
means, and Wollheim offers little explanation.
But he clearly says that we have a “single per-
ceptual experience” involving two different in-
tentional contents. Why doesn’t he think the one
content interferes with the other? How can the
perception of the surface “retain its content” if
one succeeds in making the subject of the paint-
ing the content of this one’s perceptual experi-
ence? Well, the experience has two different
“aspects.” But what does this mean? Wollheim
rejects the duck/rabbit analogy, precisely on the
grounds that it suggests an incompatibility; one
cannot presumably see the figure as a duck and
as a rabbit simultaneously. I propose that my
theory goes some way toward showing how two
different intentional contents can be combined.
The experience is a perception of the pictorial
surface imagined to be a perception of a fire en-
gine, or of whatever is depicted.
V
More needs to be said about this experience. I
have not fully specified, either here or previ-
ously, the nature of the imaginings involved or
how they are related to one’s actual seeing of the
picture surface. But I hope to have shown that
imaginings (or whatever one chooses to call
them) along the lines I have suggested are an es-
sential ingredient of picture perception, and that





Ann Arbor, Michigan 48109
INTERNET: klwalton@umich.edu
1. Richard Wollheim, “On Pictorial Representation,” The
Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 56 (1998): 217–233;
Richard Wollheim, Painting as an Art: The Andrew W.
Mellon Lectures in the Fine Arts (Princeton University
Press, 1987). My main contributions to the discussion are
Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe: On the Foundations of
the Representational Arts (Harvard University Press, 1990),
chap. 8; Walton, “Seeing-In and Seeing Fictionally,” in
James Hopkins and Anthony Savile, Mind, Psychoanalysis,
and Art: Essays for Richard Wollheim (Oxford: Blackwell,
1992), pp. 281–291; and Walton, “Pictures and Photo-
graphs: Objections Answered,” in Film Theory and Philoso-
phy, ed. Richard Allen and Murray Smith (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1997), pp. 60–75.
2. Wolheim, “On Pictorial Representation,” p. 223.
3. Ibid., p. 223; cf. Wollheim, Painting as an Art: The An-
drew W. Mellon Lectures in the Fine Arts, p. 69.
4. There is room for skepticism about this. Perhaps such
things can be depicted, misrepresented, as being visible.
Robert Hopkins has interesting things to say about this in
“Explaining Depiction,” The Philosophical Review 104
(1995): 429–431, and Picture, Image and Experience: A
Philosophical Inquiry (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1998), p. 168. Cf. Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe,
pp. 229–330.
5. Wollheim, “On Pictorial Representation,” p. 223.
6. Perhaps he means to be avoiding this commitment
when he says, “Representations that are of things merely of
some particular kind” cannot “sustain answers to the ques-
tion, Which object? Which event? or, Which woman?
Which battle?” (“On Pictorial Representation,” p. 223.) But
the sense in which they cannot is very unclear. These ques-
tions invite any number of reasonable answers: “That one,”
“The one in the picture,” “The one so-and-so is now looking
at,” “The one wearing the fancy hat,” “The one looking over
her shoulder.” Which if any of these answers is informative
will of course depend on the context. Whether they are true
when taken literally depends on one’s theory of fiction. In
Painting as an Art, Wollheim notes that “of course, ‘This is
a picture of Venus’ does not admit of existential generaliza-
tion” (Painting as an Art, p. 361, n.16).
7. The representational content of a painting is “often,
and totally misleadingly, referred to as its ‘illusionistic’ con-
tent,” Wollheim remarks. And he speaks of “the unjustified
assimilation of the representational to the illusionistic or the
imitative” (Richard Wollheim, “On Formalism and Pictorial
Organization,” The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism
59 [2001]: 131–132).
8. Wollheim, Painting as an Art, p. 361, n.21.
9. Ibid., p. 361, n. 21. On my theory, it is fictional in the
world of the picture that there are peasants but not that I see
them. Both statements express fictional truths in the specta-
tor’s game world. Cf. my Mimesis as Make-Believe, pp.
293–304.
10. Those who think that there really is something (the
Walton Depiction, Perception, and Imagination: Responses to Richard Wollheim 33
woman in the picture) that I imagine seeing still have the
problem of saying what sort of thing this is, although they
needn’t say that it is something that can actually be seen.
11. There may be no specific mode of cognitive access
such that readers imagine knowing about a person in that
manner. Nevertheless, they probably imagine that their cog-
nitive access to the person is in some ordinary manner or
other.
12. Wollheim, Painting as an Art, pp. 210, 215, 218, 223,
and 234–235.
13. Wollheim, “On Pictorial Representation,” p. 221;
Paintings as an Art, p. 46.
14. Wollheim, Paintings as an Art, p. 195.
15. In other places, Wollheim might be taken to suggest
that perspective is a matter of how things are depicted, al-
though he does not explain what this amounts to. He refers
to the “point of origin” from which something is painted
(ibid., p. 130). And he speaks of what the picture represents
“as it represents it” (ibid.).
16. Wollheim, Paintings as an Art, p. 101; cf. “On Picto-
rial Representation,” p. 225.
17. Wollheim, Paintings as an Art, chap. 3.
18. Ibid., p. 102.
19. Ibid., p. 103.
20. Robert Hopkins (among others) has argued for the
plausible thesis that depiction is necessarily from a point of
view (“Explaining Depiction,” p. 428; Picture, Image and
Experience, p. 36), while noting that there can be significant
indeterminacies in a picture’s perspective. (Ambiguities also,
I would add.) Dominic Lopes observes rightly that a picture
need not represent things from a single point of view (Lopes,
Understanding Pictures [New York: Oxford University
Press, 1996], p. 120). I think a picture might conceivably lack
a point of view entirely but that this virtually never happens.
21. My point here is essentially the same as that of an ex-
ample I introduced in another place of two circular films or
videos of a roller coaster ride, one made with a camera fixed
to the roller coaster and gyrating with it, the other made with
a camera remaining rigidly upright. What is portrayed, what
the viewer sees in the (moving) picture, is the same in the
two cases, but they are sure to affect viewers very differ-
ently. Picture perception is not just a matter of ascertaining
what is true in the world of the picture, as I put it there, or of
what we see in the picture surface, even what we see to be
included in the “represented space.” The difference between
the two films cannot be explained in terms of what we see in
them. Cf. Kendall Walton, “Make-Believe, and Its Role in
Pictorial Representation and the Acquisition of Knowl-
edge,” Philosophic Exchange 23 (1993): 81–95. Reprinted
in Aesthetics, ed. Susan Feagin and Patrick Maynard (Ox-
ford University Press, 1997).
22. Mimesis as Make-Believe, pp. 337–348.
23. The thought, if we call it that, need not be involved in
a sense that entails that the person articulate it, or say to him-
self, “I see a woman.” But the naturalness of describing
one’s experience in this way, one’s readiness to do so, sug-
gests that the thought, in an unarticulated form, is already
there. Robert Hopkins appears to recognize part of what is
needed. When you see a horse in a picture, he says, “the
thought (or some such) of a horse enters your experience of
the picture” (Picture, Image and Experience, p. 16).
24. Wollheim, Painting as an Art, pp. 46–47. Cf. “On
Pictorial Representation,” p. 221.
25. Malcolm Budd, “On Looking at a Picture,” in Psycho-
analysis, Mind and Art: Perspectives on Richard Wollheim,
ed. Jim Hopkins and Anthony Savile (Oxford: Blackwell,
1992), p. 271.
26. Wollheim, Painting as an Art, p. 47.
27. Cf., for example, the studies described by Lien B.
Pham and Shelley E. Taylor, “From Thought to Action: Ef-
fects of Process- Versus Outcome-Based Mental Simula-
tions on Performance,” Personality & Social Psychology
Bulletin 25 (1999): 250–260; Roger N. Shepard, “The Men-
tal Image,” American Psychologist 33 (1978):125–137; and
Shelley E. Taylor, Lien B. Pham, Inna D. Rivkin, and David
A. Armor, “Harnessing the Imagination: Mental Simulation,
Self-Regulation, and Coping,” American Psychologist 53
(1998):429–439. Shepard takes some of his experiments to
provide evidence that “the very same mechanisms are opera-
tive in imagery as in perception” (ibid., p. 134). Thanks to
Gregory Walton for these references.
28. Wollheim claimed that the make-believe theory has
“grave difficulties” in accounting for this phenomenon
(Paintings as an Art, p. 360, n.8).
29. Jerrold Levinson, “Wollheim on Pictorial Representa-
tion,” The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 56 (1998):
227.
30. I will not examine the most obvious difference be-
tween Levinson and Wollheim: Levinson rejects the neces-
sity of “twofoldness,” which Wollheim has always taken to
be at the very heart of his conception of seeing-in.
31. “Wollheim on Pictorial Representation,” p. 229, em-
phasis in original.
32. Jerrold Levinson, “Making Believe,” in The Plea-
sures of Aesthetics (Cornell University Press, 1996), p. 294.
33. “Wollheim on Pictorial Representation,” p. 232, n.3,
emphasis in original. Wollheim expressly allows for imagin-
ings being involuntary or passive rather than active, and so
does not share Levinson’s conception of imagining. Cf.
Wollheim, “Imagination and Identification,” in On Art and
the Mind (Harvard University Press, 1974), pp. 69 ff.
34. Ibid., p. 227.
35. See Mimesis as Make-Believe, pp. 293–352.
36. Catherine Abell and Gregory Currie, “Internal and
External Pictures,” Philosophical Psychology 12 (1999):
440–441. I do not know how Currie will square this sugges-
tion with his skeptical remarks in Image and Mind: Film,
Philosophy and Cognitive Science (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1995), which I discuss in “On Pictures and
Photographs: Objections Answered,” in Film Theory and
Philosophy, ed. Richard Allen and Murray Smith (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 60–75.
37. Wollheim, Painting as an Art, pp. 77 and 361, n.21. I
responded to this objection in Mimesis as Make-Believe, pp.
301–302. Cf. my exchange with Wollheim in Philosophy
and Phenomenological Research 51 (1991), Symposium on
Mimesis as Make-Believe, pp. 401–406 and 423–427; and
Walton, “Seeing-In and Seeing Fictionally,” p. 288. More
recently, Wollheim described me as “the major contempo-
rary advocate of the theory that we relate to the content of
pictures through the imagination rather than perceptually”
(“A Passionate Sightseer,” review of Michael Podro, Depic-
tion, in The Times Literary Supplement 23 [April 1999], p.
20). I decline the honor, having designed my theory to estab-
lish and explain the fundamentally perceptual nature of pic-
torial representation.
34 The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism
38. Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe, pp. 38 and 40–41.
39. Ibid., pp. 13–16, 23, 68, 139, 185–186, 216, 311,
351–352, and especially 217, 301–302.
40. Richard Wollheim, Art and Its Objects, 2nd ed. (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), p. 207. My prin-
ciples are not tied essentially to artists’ intentions, as his
standards of correctness are.
41. Wollheim, “On Pictorial Representation,” p. 224.
42. If the recording is of an actual concert performance
(as many of Gould’s recordings are not), in hearing (di-
rectly) the sounds from the speakers, I am hearing, indi-
rectly, the actual performance. I imagine my experience to
be one of hearing the performance directly. (Cf. my “Trans-
parent Pictures,” in Critical Inquiry 11 [1984]: 246–277.)
43. Wollheim, “On Pictorial Representation,” p. 225.
44. I am indebted to Malcolm Budd, David Hills, Jerrold
Levinson, Patrick Maynard, and Richard Wollheim for dis-
cussions of the ideas in this essay.
Walton Depiction, Perception, and Imagination: Responses to Richard Wollheim 35
